BANKRUPTCY-CHAPTER 13 'STRIP DowN'-SECTION 1322 (B) (2)
PROHIBITS A DEBTOR FROM BIFURCATING A HOMESTEAD MORTGAGEE'S CLAIM INTO SECURED AND UNSECURED PORTIONS SO AS
TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF AN UNDERSECURED MORTGAGE TO
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE COLLATERAL-Nobelman

v.

American Savings Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code'-Adjustment of Debts of an Individual With Regular Income-enables
qualified individuals to pay their debts over an extended period of
time while under the supervision and protection of a bankruptcy
court.2 Designed specifically to afford a measure of protection to
1 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)
(codified as 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993)) as amended &y Bankruptcy
Amendments And Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(1984); Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, And Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986); Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy
Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (1988); Criminal Victims
Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, 104 Stat. 2865 (1990).
2 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5799; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). See
generally 5 COLLIER ON BANKRup-rcv 1 1300.02 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993)
[hereinafter COLLIER] (describing Chapter 13's purpose and providing a textual discussion of the Code sections applicable to Chapter 13 cases).
Chapter 13's protection is available only to individuals with regular income who
submit a portion of their future earnings to a court-appointed trustee. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(a) (1) (1988). Pursuant to a court-approved plan, distribution to creditors is
then spaced over a time period of three to five years. See In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370,
1372 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted) (explaining that the court-appointed trustee
supervises the distribution of funds derived from post-petition earnings in payment of
the debtor's pre-petition obligations, as adjusted by and provided for in the plan of
reorganization).
Drafted with consumer debtors in mind, Chapter 13 is designed to correct some
of the shortfalls of former Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1948. COLLIER,
supra, 1300.01, at 1300-14. Numbered among former Chapter XIII's deficiencies
were: (1) the Chapter applied only to individual wage earners with regular income
and not to self-employed individuals; (2) there was no set duration for the plan of
reorganization which resulted in most plans requiring full payment of the entire debt
over a long period of time; and (3) there was no provision for dealing with secured
creditors, including debtors with a claim on the debtor's residence. Id. 1 1300.01, at
1300-12, 1300-13.
The 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act's Chapter 13 eliminated these deficiencies,
and more significantly, now permits modification of secured claims. H.R. REP. No.
595, supra, at 124, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6058. Specifically, Chapter 13
allows a debtor to reduce the amount of a secured claim to the market value of the
collateral and to treat the remainder of the debt as unsecured. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 506(a), 1322(b)(2) (1988). In effect, Chapter 13 recognizes the difference between true value and the collateral's value to the debtor. Grubbs v. Houston First Am.
Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 239 n.3 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Although certain items
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wage earners, Chapter 13 is a favored sanctuary for debtors seeking
to keep their homes when confronted with distressing and often
unexpected financial hardship.5 Faced with foreclosure, qualified
debtors 4 regularly turn to Chapter 13 to delay creditors and to remay not have a high resale value, such items may nevertheless be valuable to the
consumer because of sentimental or other practical considerations, i.e., high replacement costs. Id. By allowing the reduction of a secured claim to the actual market
value of the collateral securing the underlying lien, Chapter 13 eliminates some of the
secured party's leverage. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANI uvrcy LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprintedin 2
App. COLLIER ON BANKRuF-rcv 1, 169 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
3 See Regina L. Nassen, Note, Bankruptcy Code § 1322(B)(2)'s No-Modification Clause:
Who Does It Protect, 33 Amiz. L. REv. 979, 979 (1991) (proclaiming that it is "a matter
of common knowledge" that most Chapter 13 cases are filed to preserve the family
home); Ken Kahan, Comment, Home Foreclosures Under Chapter 13 Of The Bankruptcy
Reform Act, 30 UCLA L. REv. 637, 637 n.2 (1982) (citing California statistics indicating
that up to 62% of individuals facing foreclosure file for bankruptcy); see also In re
Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) ("The vast majority of Chapter 13
cases are filed by homeowners, and most plans [of reorganization] treat mortgage
defaults."); In reBruce, 40 B.R. 884, 888 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984) ("[I]n most cases, the
preservation of the residence from foreclosure is the primary reason for the filing of a
Chapter 13 case."); In re Thacker, 6 B.R. 861, 865 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980) ("[T]he
bottom line of most Chapter 13 cases is to preserve and avoid foreclosure of the family house."). This phenomenon is not unexpected; the downturn in the general economy, coupled with a decreasing value of real estate during the 1980's and early 90's,
have led to a record number of individuals filing for bankruptcy protection. See TE.
RESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, BANKRuvrcv AND CONSUMER
CREDIT IN AMERICA 3-5 (1989).
Homeowners prefer Chapter 13 over both Chapter 11, "Reorganization," and
Chapter 7, "Liquidation," because of the intended favorable treatment afforded by
Congress and incorporated into Chapter 13's various provisions. See Collier, supra
note 2, 1300.02, at 1300-18-19 (indicating that Chapter 13 maximizes the relief available to debtors); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 117, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6077 (noting that consumers do not prefer straight liquidation).
Chief among Chapter 13's more favorable provisions are: § 1306(b), which allows a
debtor to remain in possession of both exempt and non-exempt property (compare
Chapter 7, which mandates the turning over of non-exempt property to the trustee);
§ 1322(b) (5), which permits a debtor to cure home mortgage defaults even after acceleration; and § 1301, which provides for a codebtor automatic stay. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1301, 1306(b), 1322(b)(5) (1988); see also David S. Kennedy, Chapter 13 Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 19 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 137, 138-42 (1989) (providing a full exposition of the advantages of Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 and Chapter 11).
4 Code § 109(e) sets forth the qualifications a debtor must possess to file a Chapter 13 petition. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988). Section 109(e) provides:
Only an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of the
filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less
than $100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less
than $350,000, or an individual with regular income and such individual's spouse, except for a stockbroker or a commodity broker, that owe,
on the date of the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts that aggregate less than $100,000 and noncontingent, liq-
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organize their financial affairs. 5 Chapter 13 provides these necessary protections by allowing homeowners to cure mortgage
defaults,6 to prevent execution on foreclosure judgments,7 and
even to cure defaults after foreclosure sales have already been
conducted.8
uidated, secured debts of less than $350,000 may be a debtor under
Chapter 13 of this title.
Id.
5 See Sauber, 115 B.R. at 199 (emphasizing that homeowners file most Chapter 13
cases). The mere filing of a Chapter 13 petition stays all proceedings against a debtor,
including "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate" and "any act to
create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate." 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(3)-(4) (1988). Thus, a debtor can prevent the continuation of a foreclosure
proceeding by filing a petition and invoking the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
See id. The stay remains in effect until the case is closed, dismissed, or at the "time a
discharge is granted or denied." 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2) (1988). The stay enjoins not
only the enforcement of a mortgagee's rights and remedies, but is also broad enough
to prevent the issuance of a notice of default and acceleration. COLLER REAL ESTATE
TRANsACnTONS AND THE BANKRtuircy CODE 2.01 [1], at 2-3 (Lawrence P. King ed.,

1992) [hereinafter REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS].

6 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988) ("provid[ing] for the curing of any default
within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is pending"). A
default is an event, often defined in the security documents, that triggers certain consequences such as the right to accelerate the entire indebtedness or the commencement of foreclosure proceedings. In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1982).
Common events of default in a home mortgage include non-payment of principal or
interest charges, non-payment of property taxes or insurance premiums, non-compliance with laws or governmental regulations, and even the filing of bankruptcy. REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, supra note 5, 1 2.01 [1]-[2], at 2-5, 2-6, 2-7. A mortgagor may
eliminate the consequences of default by "taking care of the triggering event and
returning to pre-default conditions." Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26-27; see, e.g., In re Glenn,
760 F.2d 1428, 1442 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that a Chapter 13 debtor possesses a
right to cure a default up until the property has been sold at foreclosure), cert. denied,
Miller v. First Fed. of Mich., 474 U.S. 849 (1985); In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 874 (7th
Cir. 1984) (allowing a debtor to cure a mortgage default even after the mortgagee
had obtained a judgment in foreclosure); Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 247 (proclaiming that
curing a mortgage default is authorized by § 1322(b) (3) and is not a prohibited modification of a secured creditor's rights); see also Brian G. Smooke, Chapter 13: Treatment
Of Home Mortgages, 3 BANKu. DEV. L.J. 433 (1986) (providing an overview of decisions
interpreting and applying § 1322(b) (5)'s cure provision).
7 See, e.g., United Sav. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.,
484 U.S. 365, 369 (1988) (stating that the Bankruptcy Code prevents a creditor from
taking any action to foreclose on collateral); In re Acevedo, 26 B.R. 994, 997 & n.5
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (accepting the Second Circuit's rationale in In re Taddeo and
urging that a default could be cured even after a final judgment has been obtained);
United Companies Fin. Corp. v. Brantley, 6 B.R. 178, 189 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980)
(prohibiting the execution on a foreclosure judgment and allowing a debtor to cure
arrearages).
8 Ruth M. Gulas, Note, In Re Glenn: The Court EstablishesA PointIn The Chapter 13
Bankruptcy Process Wien The Homeowner's Right To Cure His Defaulted Mortgage Is Terminated, 17 U. TOL. L. REv. 653, 674-75 (1986). For cases allowing a mortgagor to cure
defaults after a foreclosure sale has been conducted, see In re Smith, 43 B.R. 313, 31819 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) (asserting that a debtor has a right to cure a default after
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Moreover, until recently, a majority of the circuit courts that
have considered the issue, the Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits, permitted a homeowner to bifurcate a mortgagee's lien
on the debtor's primary residence into secured and unsecured
claims.9 Through bifurcation, a debtor could then void the portion of the lien attached to the unsecured claim.' Once a debtor
the foreclosure sale has been conducted even though his petition in bankruptcy was
not filed until after the sale); In re Chambers, 27 B.R. 687, 689-90 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1983) (holding that deceleration and reinstitution of a mortgage are available even
after the foreclosure sale, as long as the state redemption period has not expired by
the time the debtor has filed his petition in bankruptcy). But see Glenn, 760 F.2d at
1435 (choosing the foreclosure sale date as the cut-off point for debtors' rights to
cure defaults under Chapter 13); In re Pearson, 10 B.R. 189, 193 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1981) (remarking that once a foreclosure sale has taken place a "debtor cannot recover his home" by filing for relief under Chapter 13).
9 Margaret Howard, Stripping Down Liens: Section 506(d) and the Theoy of Bankruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 373, 395 (1991) (stating that while the majority of courts
declare bifurcation permissible, there is a split in the reported decisions); see, e.g., In re
Bellamy, 962 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Our view, consistent with the other circuits that have addressed this issue, is that § 1322(b) (2) prohibits modification of a
residential mortgage lender's rights only insofar as the mortgagee holds a secured
claim."); In re Hart, 923 F.2d 1410, 1411 (10th Cir. 1991) ("We hold that the bifurcation was a recognition of the legal status of the creditor's interest in the debtors'
property and not a modification of the mortgage."); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[W]e hold today that section
1322(b) (2) does not preclude the modification of any 'unsecured' portion of an undersecured claim."); In re Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The secured portion [of a residential mortgage lender's claim] has special protection ....
The unsecured portion does not."). These decisions were generally recognized as the
majority approach. Howard, supra, at 395 & n.95.
A "secured claim" is supported or backed by collateral. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1354 (6th ed. 1990). An "unsecured claim," on the other hand, is not supported by
pledged collateral. Id. at 1539. In case of default, a secured creditor is assured of
payment by foreclosing on the pledged collateral. See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 25
(2d Cir. 1982).
In United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., the Court explained that pursuant to
§ 506(a), a claim is secured only up to the amount of the collateral securing such
claim, and the remainder is classified as an unsecured claim. United States v. Ron
Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 239 (1989). In essence, the bifurcation of a lender's
mortgage lien into secured and unsecured claims allows a debtor to reduce the
amount of the mortgage lien to the current market value of the collateral. See id. at
239 n.3; see also In re Barnes, 146 B.R 854, 855 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992) (explaining
the theory and practical effect of the bifurcation procedure). Because Chapter 13
reorganization plans typically provide for a return of $.10, or less, on the dollar, a
lender stands to lose a substantial amount of money. See Nassen, supra note 3, at 982
(citing In re Frost, 96 B.R. 804, 805 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Hill, 96 B.R. 809,
810 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (providing for 5% and 13% returns, respectively, to
unsecured creditors)).
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988). Section 506(d) states, in relevant part: "To the
extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured
claim, such lien is void .... " Id.; see also In re Etchin, 128 B.R. 662, 665 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1991) (expressing the generally accepted view that § 506(d) voids an unsecured

1994]

NOTE

1037

made the required pro rata payments, if any, to unsecured credi-

tors pursuant to the Chapter 13 Plan of Reorganization, the unsecured portion of the claim would be discharged.'

Thus, under

the majority bifurcation approach, an undersecured home mortgage lender with a claim on a Chapter 13 debtor's principal residence could have the unsecured portion of the claim discharged
12
and suffer a substantial loss.
claim); Howard, supra note 9, at 375-88 (discussing §§ 506(a) and 506(d) in detail
and describing the effect of lien voidance from a policy perspective).
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (Supp. IV 1993); Etchin, 128 B.R. at 665. To be confirmed, the plan of reorganization must first meet the following six requirements:
(1) The plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with the
other applicable provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28,
or by the plan, to be paid before confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim
is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the
estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such
date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the
plan(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B) (i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the
lien securing such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to
be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than
the allowed amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to
such holder; and
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to
comply with the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1988).
These requirements are less onerous and therefore not as strict as the requirements for confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 153-54. Furthermore, the contents of the plan are for the most part permissive and must simply
provide for the submission of funds and future earnings to a court-appointed trustee
for distribution to creditors. COLLIER, supra note 2, 1 1322.02, at 1322-24. Compare 11
U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1)-(3) (1988) (listing mandatory requirements of a Chapter 13
plan) with 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1)-(10) (1988) (cataloguing permissive provisions of
the reorganization plan). A discharge, therefore, is easily obtained once a debtor
complies with the plan's mandatory provisions. 11 U.S.C. 1328(a) (Supp. IV 1993);
see also Kennedy, supra note 3, at 158-59 (recognizing that a Chapter 13 discharge is
often called a "super" or "full compliance" discharge and is broader than a Chapter 7
discharge).
12 See Alexander L. Cataldo et al., Residential Mortgage Bifurcation Under Chapter 13
Of The Bankruptcy Code, 96 COM. L.J. 225, 245-47 (1991) (explaining that if the mortgaged property were to appreciate in value, the lender would suffer a "double
whammy" because not only would the principal amount of the loan be reduced, but
the lender would also be prevented from recouping any of the post-bankruptcy appre-
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Other jurisdictions, however, including the Fifth Circuit and
bankruptcy courts in the First, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, did not adhere to the majority bifurcation approach.13 Relying on a plain reading of § 1322(b) (2), these courts
prevented a debtor from using § 506(a) to divide a mortgagee's
lien into secured and unsecured claims.1 4 Therefore, under the
from modifying
minority interpretation, a debtor was prohibited
15
the rights of homestead mortgage lenders.
ciation); see, e.g., Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 178 (debtors discharged their unsecured debt
including the lender's entire unsecured claim of $23,840.85); Hart, 923 F.2d at 1411
(unsecured portion of the lender's claim was $25,000.00); Etchin, 128 B.R. at 664 (unsecured portion of three separate lenders' claims aggregated $58,800.00); Wilson, 895
F.2d at 124 (unsecured portion of the lender's claim was $16,176.75); Hougland, 886
F.2d at 1182 (unsecured portion of the lender's claim was $4,850.78); In re Russell, 93
B.R. 703, 704 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988) (unsecured portion of lender's claim was
$36,237.01). For an early criticism of these decisions, see Patricia Lindauer, Note,
Optimizing The "FreshStart": Mortgage Cramdown Under Chapter 13 Of The Bankruptcy
Code, I1 J. L. & COM. 257, 259 (1992) (opining that the decisions allowing bifurcation
"take the 'fresh start' policy of the Bankruptcy Code to an unintended extreme").
13 See TracyJ. Cowan, Note, Modification of an UndersecuredHome Mortgage in a Chapter 13 Proceeding,56 Mo. L. REv. 841, 842 (1991); see, e.g., In re Nobleman, 968 F.2d
483, 489 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[B]ifurcation of an undersecured home mortgage runs
afoul of the specific protection afforded under section 1322(b) (2) . .

. .");

In re Mitch-

ell, 125 B.IL 5, 8 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) ("[D]ebtors... are not allowed to bifurcate the
security interest of a first mortgagee on residential real property into secured and
unsecured portions as defined under section 506(a) for purposes of proposing a
plan."); Etchin, 128 B.R. at 665 ("[B]ifurcation and partial avoidance of an undersecured home mortgage by a Chapter 13 debtor runs afoul of the specific protection
afforded to creditors whose claims are secured only by a debtor's principal residence
under § 1322(b) (2)."); In re Boullion, 123 B.R. 549, 551 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990)
("Application of 11 U.S.C. § 506 to reduce the dollar amount of claims secured by an
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence under Chapter 13
would be a 'modification' specifically prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2)."); In re
Chavez, 117 B.R. 733, 737 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) ("[T]his Court holds that bifurcation of [the lender's] claim would result in the impermissible modification of [the
lender's] mortgage rights in violation of § 1322(b) (2) of the Bankruptcy Code."); In re
Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200, 203 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) ("Section 1322(b) (2) prohibits
modification of the rights of the holder of an undersecured mortgage claim on the
debtor's principal residence."); In re Bradshaw, 56 B.R. 742, 744 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1985) ("On its face, the plain language of section 1322(b) (2) clearly prohibits ... any
modification of the terms of a loan secured only by a security interest in the debtor's
principal residence.").
14 Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 487, 488 (indicating that the clear meaning of
§ 1322(b) (2) prohibits bifurcation); Mitchell 125 B.R. at 7 (opining that § 1322(b) (2)
is neither complicated nor ambiguous); Etchin, 128 B.R. at 664 (concluding that
§ 1322(b)(2)'s language clearly prohibits "lien stripping"); Chavez, 117 B.R. at 735
(declaring that § 1322(b) (2)'s words clearly express the statute's prohibition against
modification); Bradshaw, 56 B.R. at 744 (emphasizing that on its face § 1322(b)(2)
does not permit modification).
15 See Cowan, supra note 13, at 848 & n.59. See supra note 13 and cases cited
therein for a list of courts applying the minority interpretation. The court, in In re
Schum, defined "modify" as "to change somewhat the form or qualities of; alter some-
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Recently, in Nobeman v. American Savings Bank,' 6 the Supreme
Court of the United States addressed whether a Chapter 13 debtor
may bifurcate a mortgagee's claim on the debtor's primary residence into secured and unsecured portions. 17 In an unanimous
decision, the Court concluded that a debtor may not valuate and
bifurcate a mortgage claim pursuant to § 506 in an effort to reduce
the amount of mortgage security to the residence's fair market
value.' 8
On June 21, 1984, American Savings Bank (American) loaned
Leonard and Harriet Nobelman $68,250 to purchase a condominium unit that was to be their primary residence. 19 The Nobelmans,
in turn, executed a promissory note in the face amount of the loan
and a deed of trust as security for the loan. 2' After defaulting on
what; ... to reduce in degree; moderate; qualify; ... to change; to become changed."
In re Schum, 112 B.R. 159, 161 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) (quotation omitted).
16 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993). For an analysis of the bankruptcy court's initial decision
and the decision's progeny, see T.G. MaCauley, Note, Nobleman v. American Savings
Bank: Section 1322(B)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code Bars Bifurcation of an Undersecured Mortgage Secured Solely by the Debtor's PrincipalResidence, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1271 (1993).
17 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2108.
18 Id. at 2111. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court and emphasized
that § 1322(b) (2) prohibited such a modification of the "rights" of home mortgage
lenders. Id. at 2108, 2111. Justice Stevens, in a one paragraph concurring opinion,
observed that the result was mandated by the clear legislative history of Chapter 13
and therefore joined in the Court's opinion and judgment. Id. at 2112 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
The Court acknowledged that § 506(a) is applicable, as a statute of general applicability, to Chapter 13. Id. at 2109 n.3; see 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988) (providing that
"chapters 1, 3, and 5 of [the Code] apply in a case under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13").
The Court, however, commented that because the debtors' application of § 506(a)
would conflict with the provisions of § 1322(b) (2), the latter must prevail. Nobelman,
113 S. Ct. at 2111; see also In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (accepting the "tenet of statutory construction" that where there is a conflict between two
statutes of the same enactment, a statute of general applicability does not prevail over
another provision that deals specifically with the matter in question).
19 In re Nobelman, 129 B.R. 98, 98, 99 (N.D. Tex. 1991), aff'd, In re Nobleman, 968
F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992), aftfd, Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106
(1993).
20 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2108. A deed of trust is a mortgage instrument by which
the borrower conveys title of the mortgage security to a third person to hold in trust
as security for payment of the debt. See GEORGE E. OSBORNE ET AL., REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAW § 1.6 (1979) (describing a deed of trust as a "mortgage variant" granting
the trustee a power of sale). Should a borrower default on the note, the trustee, who
could also be the lender, may sell the mortgage security without bringing a judicial
foreclosure action. Id. As such, a foreclosure sale pursuant to a deed of trust is preferred over a judicial foreclosure because it is a more efficient and less time consuming procedure. See MICHAEL T. MADISON &JEFFRY R. DWYER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE
FINANCING 1 3.08 [1] (1981) (defining a deed of trust and pointing out that its primary
function is to avoid the delay and cost ofjudicial foreclosure). In Nobelman, the deed
of trust also included an undivided .67% security interest in the condominium com-
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the loan, the Nobelmans filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. 2 1
During the pendency of the bankruptcy case, American filed a
proof of claim in the amount of $71,335.22 Subsequently, the
Nobelmans, in their modified plan of reorganization, valued the
condominium at $23,500 and filed a motion pursuant to § 506(a)
for a judicial determination of the market value of their home.23
At the confirmation hearing, the market value of the residence was
uncontested, and accordingly, the Nobelmans proposed to cure arrearages and to reinstate their original mortgage contract in the
amount of $23,500.24 Under the plan, the remainder of the bank's
plex's common areas including escrow funds, rents, and any proceeds from hazard
insurance. Nobelman, 129 B.R at 99.
21 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2108. The Noblemans defaulted on their loan by failing
to make the required mortgage payments. Id. The Nobelmans then filed for relief
under Chapter 13 of the Code. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) ("The
commencement of a voluntary case under a chapter of this title constitutes an order
for relief under such chapter."). The Nobelmans' filing effectively stayed any action
by the lender to enforce its rights as provided for in the loan documents or under
state law. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(5) (1988). See supra note 5 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Code's automatic stay provision.
22 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2108. Initially, the amount of the proof of claim was
$71,265.04, but the bank later amended this claim. Nobelman, 129 B.R at 99. In its
proof of claim, American acknowledged that it was secured only to the extent of the
value of its mortgage security and that it was unsecured for any resulting deficiency.
Id.
A proof of claim is defined as "a written statement setting forth a creditor's
claim." FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(a) (Supp. IV 1993). A proof of claim provides a
means by which creditors and other security interest holders present their claims to
the bankruptcy court. See 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988) ("A creditor ... may file a proof
of claim. An equity security holder may file a proof of interest."). Generally, a creditor files a proof of claim setting forth the amount owed on its note to include, among
other things, the principal balance, any fees incurred, and accrued interest. See id.
§§ 501, 502 (1988).
23 Nobelman, 129 B.R. at 99; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988) (allowing a debtor
to modify a plan of reorganization "at any time before confirmation"). Section 506(a)
provides:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which
the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of
this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's
interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to the extent of the
amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim
to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so
subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such
value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of
the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction
with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such
creditor's interest.
Id. § 506(a) (1988).
24 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2108. To confirm a Plan of Reorganization, the court
must hold a confirmation hearing at which time any party in interest may object to
the debtor's plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1324 (1988). The court must notify interested par-
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was classified as an unsecured claim payclaim, namely $41,257.66,
25
able "pari passu."
Objecting to the proposed treatment of its claim, American
argued that its rights as a home mortgage lender were being impermissibly altered in violation of § 1322(b) (2).26 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division,
agreed and refused to confirm the Nobelmans' plan of reorganization.2 7 In its decision, the district court reviewed the holdings of
ties of the hearing and afford them an opportunity to object to the confirmation of
the plan. Id.; FED. R. BANKR. P. 3020(b) (Supp. IV 1993). In Nobelman, although the
lender, a party in interest, objected to the plan, it did not object to the debtor's valuation of the residence. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2108-09.
25 Nobelman, 129 B.R. at 99. Paripassu refers to the equal treatment of generally
unsecured claims in a bankruptcy proceeding-unsecured claims are paid in equal
proportion to each other. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1115 (6th ed. 1990). In this case,
because the Nobelmans' plan did not provide for any payment to unsecured creditors, the bank stood to lose $41,257.66 if the plan was confirmed. See Nobelman, 129
B.R. at 99.
26 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2109. See infra notes 89 and 92 (listing the lender's rights
in a Chapter 13 proceeding). The Standing Chapter 13 Trustee also objected to the
plan for the same reasons. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2109. Both objections were based
on a plain reading of § 1322(b), which states:
Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the [Chapter 13] plan
may(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim
secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's
principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims; ....
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
A standing trustee is appointed under § 586 of tide 28. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(b)
(1988). Once appointed, a standing trustee has the power to:
(1) perform the duties specified in sections 704(2), 704(4), 704(5),
704(6), 704(7) and 704(9) of this tide;
(2) appear and be heard at any hearing that concerns(A) the value of property subject to a lien;
(B) confirmation of a plan; or
(C) modification of the plan after confirmation;
(3) dispose of, under regulations issued by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, moneys received or to be received in a case under chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act; and [sic]
(4) advise, other than on legal matters, and assist the debtor in performance under the plan; and
(5) ensure that the debtor commences making timely payments under
section 1326 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (1988).
27 Nobelman, 129 B.R. at 99, 104. A denial of confirmation may result in the dismissal of the case or its conversion into a Chapter 7 case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(5)
(1988). If a case is dismissed, then the creditor retains its security interest and can
continue to enforce its rights under state law. See id. § 349(b) (1988). On the other
hand, if the case is converted to Chapter 7, the debtor would be forced to liquidate
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the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that permitted the bifurcation of a home mortgage lender's claim on the debtor's principal
residence. 28 Finding these decisions to be based on strained and
unconvincing analyses, the district court held that the plain language and legislative history of § 1322(b) (2) prevented the modifi29
cation of a home mortgage lender's rights.
Agreeing with the district court's plain language and congressional intent arguments, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.3 0 The court deemed the legislative history
of § 1322(b) (2) dispositive of Congress's intent regarding the bifurcation issue. 3 1 To allow bifurcation, the court of appeals dehis estate, and the trustee would likely abandon the mortgage security if the debtor
did not have any equity in the residence. See id. § 554(a) (1988).
28 Nobelman, 129 B.R. at 100-01 (citations omitted). The district court specifically
focused on the Ninth Circuit decision, In re Hougland, and explained that "the
Houglandcourt simply assumed that because section 506(a) may be applied to Chapter 13 proceedings pursuant to section 103(a), every undersecured claim in a Chapter
13 proceeding is automatically transformed into a secured and unsecured claim. This
assumption is the foundation upon which the entire Houglanddecision rests, and it is
flawed...." Id. at 100, 101. Likewise, the court criticized the Third Circuit's decision
in Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. because the Third Circuit had relied upon
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning when it held that § 506's general provisions controlled
§ 1322(b)(2)'s specific provisions. Id. at 100, 101-02. Finally, the district court took
issue with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that § 1322(b) (2) " ' kicks in' only to prevent
any further modification of [a] secured claim." Id. at 102 (quoting In re Hart, 923 F.2d
1410, 1417 (10th Cir. 1991) (Brorby, J., dissenting)). This would render
§ 1322(b) (2), the district court observed, essentially meaningless. Id. (quoting Hart,
923 F.2d at 1417 (Brorby, J., dissenting)).
29 Nobelman, 129 B.R. at 104. The court also dismissed the Nobelmans' contention
that the deed of trust secured more than the primary residence. Id. In addition to
securing the Noblemans' condominium, the deed of trust provided for an undivided
.67% interest in the common areas of the condominium complex. Id. Because the
deed of trust covered the .67% interest in the condominium's common areas, the
Noblemans argued that § 1322(b) (2) could not apply; by its very terms, § 1322(b) (2)
applies solely to "claim [s] secured only by a security interest in real property." Id. (citation omitted); 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the
court rejected the Noblemans' argument because a .67% interest in a condominium's
common areas is not a sufficient interest to warrant the non-applicability of
§ 1322(b)(2). Nobleman, 129 B.R. at 104.
30 In re Nobleman, 968 F.2d 483, 484, 487, 488 (5th Cir. 1992), afd, Nobleman v.
American Say. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993). Both courts examined the legislative history of § 1322(b) (2) and determined that Congress intended to afford special protection to home mortgage lenders. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 488-89; Nobelman, 129 B.R. at
103-04. Each court then summarily dismissed other circuit courts' analyses of the
issue and contrary holdings, declaring them inconsistent with the legislative intent
and clear meaning of the statute. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 486-88; Nobelman, 129 B.R. at
100-04.
31 Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 488-89. The Fifth Circuit, in Grubbs, had previously examined the legislative history of § 1322 in detail and therefore was fully cognizant of
Congress's intent. Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 243-46 (5th
Cir. 1984). As originally proposed, the Grubbs court explained, the House version of
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cided, would vitiate the specific protections granted to home
mortgage lenders with claims secured only by a debtor's primary
residence. 2 The Fifth Circuit also found further support in a res3
cent United States Supreme Court decision, Dewsnup v. Timm,
which prohibited a Chapter 7 debtor from using § 506(a) to strip
down a lien secured by the debtor's real property.34
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari35 to determine whether, in a Chapter 13 case, § 1322(b) (2) permits the
bifurcation of a home mortgage lender's claim secured by the
debtor's principal residence. 36 The Court found bifurcation impermissible and held that a debtor could not use the valuation and
bifurcation provisions of § 506(a) to modify a home mortgage
lender's rights.3 7 Such modification, the Court declared, is prohib§ 1322(b) (2), set forth in H.R. 8200, provided that the debtor's plan may modify the
rights of holders of secured claims or of holders of unsecured claims. Id. at 243. The
court noted that, in this respect, the House version was more encompassing than the
Bankruptcy Commission's recommendation calling for the inclusion of a provision
allowing for the modification of secured and unsecured claims on a debtor's personal
property. Id. (citing COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 204-05). The Senate version of § 1322(b) (2), as set forth in S.B.2266, allowed a debtor's plan to "modify the
rights of holders of secured claims (other than claims wholly secured by mortgages on real
property) or of holders of unsecured claims." Id. at 245, n.14. The court buttressed its
analysis by explaining that during the course of deliberations, the Senate retreated
from its insistence that no claim secured by a mortgage on a debtor's real property
could be modified and settled for the current version of § 1322(b) (2) which bars
modification of "a claim 'secured only by a security interest in real property that is the
debtor's principal residence.'" Id. at 246.
32 Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 489.
33 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992). But see Lindauer, supra note 12, at 1275 (stating that the
Dewsnup holding was limited to the facts of that particular case).
34 Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 487 (citing Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778). In Dewsnup, the
Supreme Court held that a Chapter 7 debtor could not 'strip down' a lien on real
property to the fair market value of the property pursuant to § 506(d). Dewsnup, 112
S. Ct. at 778. Because the claim at issue was an allowed claim pursuant to § 502, the
court reasoned that § 506(d) does not apply and that the "lien stays with the real
property until the foreclosure [because] that is what was bargained for by the mortgagor and the mortgagee." Id. at 777, 778.
35 Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992).
36 Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106, 2108 (1993).
37 Id. at 2111. Justice Stevens concurred in the opinion and judgment of the
Court and authored a one paragraph concurrence emphasizing the legislative history
favoring home mortgage lenders. Id. at 2111-12 (Stevens, J., concurring). The
Nobelman Court's decision was widely acclaimed by the lending community. See High
Court: Thumbs Down on 'Stripdowns, 15 NAT'L L.J. June 14, 1993, at 5, 9 (describing
the lending community's strong interest in the Nobleman case). In addition, scholars
had frequently criticized the earlier decisions holding that bifurcation was permissible. See Erik Klingenberg, Esq., Chapter 13: Circuits Split on Strip Down of Home Mortgages, 21 REAL PROP. L. SEC. NEWSLETTER (N.Y. St. B. Ass'n, New York, N.Y.)Jan., 1993,
at 7, 7-9 (criticizing the pro-bifurcation decisions, especially the Second Circuit's decision in In re Bellamy); Lindauer, supra note 12, at 281 (arguing that bifurcation pro-
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ited by § 1322(b) (2).38
Notwithstanding Congress's specific intent to carve out an exception for home mortgage lenders, a majority of circuit courts,
prior to Nobelman, authorized bifurcation in an effort to promote
the Bankruptcy Code's "fresh start" policy.3 9 For example, in In re
Hougland,40 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed the
issue of bifurcation in a Chapter 13 case. 4 The Hougland court,
relying on tenets of statutory interpretation, ruled that
vides a debtor with a windfall by taking "the fresh start policy to the extreme"). But
cf., Peter H. Carroll, III, Cramdoum of Residential Mortgages in Chapter13 Cases, 20 CoLO.
LAw. 881, 882 (May 1991) (claiming that bifurcation of an undersecured home mortgage claim is fair to other secured creditors); Cowan, supra note 13, at 854-55 (commenting that bifurcation encourages debtors to file for Chapter 13 instead of Chapter
7 and is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's fresh start policy).
38 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111.
39 Howard, supra note 9, at 395; see In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d 176, 186 (2d Cir. 1992)
("We believe [discharging the unsecured portion of the debt after bifurcation is] a
measurable contribution to the Code's 'fresh start' policy."); In re Hart, 923 F.2d
1410, 1411 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding "that the bifurcation was a recognition of the
legal status of the creditor's interest in the debtors' property and not a modification
of the mortgage"); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 127 (3d
Cir. 1990) (holding "that section 1322(b) (2) does not preclude the modification of
any 'unsecured' portion of an undersecured claim"); In re Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182,
1185 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The secured portion [of a residential mortgage lender's claim]
has special protection ....The unsecured portion does not."); see also In re McNair,
115 B.R. 520, 523 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990) (giving consideration to the Bankruptcy
Code's "fresh start" policy before deciding whether bifurcation was permissible) (citation omitted); In re Harris, 94 B.R 832, 836 (D.N.J. 1989) (proclaiming that bifurcation promotes the "fresh start" policy by not saddling the debtor with unsecured
debt); In re Simmons, 78 B.R. 300, 304 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987) (reaching its decision
mindful of the Bankruptcy Code's "fresh start" policy) (citations omitted).
One of the Code's internal goals is to return an insolvent debtor to a useful
economic role by granting the debtor a "fresh start." See COLLIER, supra note 2,
RP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 118, reprinted in 1978
1 1300.01, at 1300-9; H.RE
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6078; see also Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S.
539, 554-55 (1915) (noting that the goal of the bankruptcy process is to permit an
honest debtor a fresh start) (citations omitted).
40 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989); see Howard, supra note 9, at 395 (citing Hougland
as the leading case allowing bifurcation under § 1322(b) (2)); Cowan, supra note 13,
at 842 (concluding that "the Hougland Court's result is fair, logical, and should be
adopted by all courts"). But see Lindauer, supra note 12, at 271-77 (criticizing the
Hougland court's analysis). See generally Nassen, supranote 3, at 992-93 (describing the
Ninth Circuit's analytical approach to the bifurcation issue).
41 See Klingenberg, supra note 37, at 7 (indicating that the Ninth Circuit was the
first circuit court to address the bifurcation issue). The debtors obtained a mortgage
from the lender under a veteran's home mortgage assistance program that permitted
negative amortization of the loan. Hougland,886 F.2d at 1182. As a result, at the time
of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the balance of the loan was greater than
the value of the property. Id. at 1182-83. The debtors sought to bifurcate the mortgage loan into secured and unsecured portions presumably so they could subsequently discharge the unsecured portion of the mortgagee's claim. See id. at 1183.
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§ 1322(b) (2) permitted bifurcation.4 2 Maintaining that the plain
meaning of the statute mandated such a result, the court dismissed
43
any suggestion that §§ 506(a) and 1322(b) (2) were in conflict.
Additionally, the Hougland court noted that real estate lenders
would not be adversely affected by the court's interpretation of the
statute because most lenders would ensure that a sufficient equity
cushion existed, thereby
preventing any portion of their claim
44
from being unsecured.
In Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp.,45 a factually analogous case, the Third Circuit followed suit and reached the same
result as the Hougland court. 46 Relying on § 1322(b) (2)'s plain
meaning, the Wilson court embraced the Ninth Circuit's statutory
42 Id. at 1184. Specifically, the Houglandcourt insisted that "[w] hen normal principles of statutory construction are applied, the analysis of this statutory scheme is relatively simple." Id. at 1183 (footnote omitted). First, the court stated that the terms
.secured claim" and "unsecured claim" have the same meanings in § 1322(b) (2) as
they do in § 506(a). Id. Therefore, the court concluded, a claim can have a secured
and unsecured portion. Id. at 1183-84. The court then examined § 1322(b)(2)'s
"other than" clause and determined that because "[t]hat clause follows the secured
claim portion of the sentence and precedes the unsecured claim portion," it must
refer only to the secured portion of a claim and not to any unsecured portion. Id. See
infra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing later criticism of the Houglanddecision).
The Ninth Circuit's analysis was rejected in In re Sauber. In re Sauber, 115 B.R.
197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990). The Saubercourt stated:
The Ninth Circuit, in Hougland, takes an overly technocratic approach
in both analyzing the language of § 1322(b) (2) and (b) (5), and in relating § 506(a) to it. Although ostensibly undertaken in search of the
plain meaning of these statutes, that meaning, and the proper setting of
the statutes in the context of the overall scheme of the Code, is as
clearly missed as the proverbial forest might be missed in examining the
trees.
Id.
43 Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1184. The court did not even consider the legislative
history because "the statute is internally consistent." Id. at 1185.
44 Id. at 1184. The Hougland court's observation has, of course, not withstood the
test of time as the general downturn in the United States economy, coupled with
falling real estate values, have caused many mortgages to become undersecured. See
Nassen, supra note 3, at 1005 (observing that during the 1980's the total amount of
real estate loans increased "from $268 billion to $750 billion," of which $130 billion
were in default) (footnotes omitted); see also Lindauer, supra note 12, at 266 n.62
(identifying the various scenarios which could cause a mortgage to become undersecured) (citation omitted). For a more detailed examination of the court's decision
in Hougland,see Cowan, supra note 13.
45 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990). See generally Nassen, supra note 3, at 993 (discussing
the Wilson court's holding); Lindauer, supra note 12, at 271-77 (criticizing the Third
Circuit's utilization of § 1322(b) (2)'s legislative history to permit cramdown).
46 Wilson, 895 F.2d at 127. The amount of the loan balance in Wilson was
$38,176.75 and the stipulated value of the property was only $22,000. Id. at 124. The
debtors sought to limit the amount of the mortgage lender's claim to the value of the
residence and to treat the remainder as unsecured. Id.
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interpretation and dismissed the statute's legislative history as inconclusive. 47 The court summarily rejected the mortgagee's contention that the provisions of § 1322(b) (2), a statute of specific
applicability, controlled the general provisions of § 506(a) .4 8 Consequently, the Third Circuit concluded that the bifurcation of a
home mortgage lender's claim under § 506(a) is not prohibited by
§ 1322(b) (2). 49
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also
adopted the majority bifurcation approach in In re Hart.5" While
conceding that the legislative intent of § 1322(b) (2) was to afford
greater protection to home mortgage lenders, the Hart court determined that a plain interpretation of the statute permitted bifurca47 Id. at 127. The court noted that "[i]n determining the meaning of any statute,
the words of the statute are 'the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of
interpreting' its meaning." Id. (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 n.9 (1981)
(citation omitted)). In response to the mortgage lender's argument that the legislative history of the statue compelled a different result, the court asserted,
"[u]nfortunately, our review of the history of the provision does not provide us with
much insight into the critical question here." Id.
48 Id. at 128. Particularly, the Third Circuit stated that such an interpretation
would "require that we ignore section 506(a) in Chapter 13 proceedings, which is
inconsistent with our earlier precedent that holds that section is fully applicable to
Chapter 13." Id. (citation omitted).
49 Id. In addition to ruling that bifurcation is permissible, the Wilson court also
declared that the mortgagee's claim was secured by the debtor's personal property as
well as the debtor's principal residence. Id. Thus, the court did not even have to
reach the bifurcation issue because a claim that is secured by other than the debtor's
principal residence does not fall within the purview of § 1322(b) (2). See Lindauer,
supra note 12, at 264 n.48. The court's alternate holding was based on § 1322(b) (2)'s
specific language which only protects claims "secured only by a security interest in
real property that is the debtor's principal residence." Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988)). Referencing the lender's mortgage, the court
observed that the lender had a security interest in the Wilsons' personal property,
including appliances, furniture, and other personalty. Id. As such, the court held
that § 1322(b)(2)'s anti-modification provision did not apply. Id. at 129.
50 923 F.2d 1410, 1411, 1415 (10th Cir. 1990). The Harts' loan balance was
$55,000, but the property's market value was only $30,000. Id. The Harts filed a Plan
of Reorganization bifurcating the mortgage lender's claim into secured and unsecured portions. Id. The lender objected to the bifurcation of its claim, but the
Tenth Circuit held that bifurcation was permitted. Id. at 1411, 1415. Prior to the Hart
decision, bankruptcy courts in the Tenth Circuit were divided on the bifurcation issue. Compare In re Brouse, 110 B.R. 539, 543-44 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (allowing a
debtor to use § 506(d) to bifurcate a mortgagee's claim) and In re Ross, 107 B.R. 759,
762-63 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989) (permitting the modification of a mortgage lender's
rights with respect to the unsecured portion of the claim) and In re Simmons, 78 B.R.
300, 303 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987) (agreeing that § 1322(b) (2) does not protect an undersecured home mortgage) with In re Woodall, 123 B.R. 95, 98 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1990) (asserting that for public policy reasons "§ 506(a) may not be used to bifurcate
a claim under § 1322(b) (2)") and In re Christiansen, 121 B.R. 63, 64 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1990) (adopting a plain reading and common-sense approach to § 1322(b) (2)).
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tion. 51 Accepting the notion that bifurcation could be deemed a
modification of the mortgage, the court nonetheless ruled that bifurcation is not an impermissible modification of a secured claim
pursuant to § 1322(b) (2).52
More recently, in In re Bellamy,53 the Second Circuit echoed
the majority view that bifurcation of a lender's mortgage claim on a
Chapter 13 debtor's primary residence is permissible.5 4 Despite
recognizing that the "rights" referred to in § 1322(b) (2) are
broader than the term "claims," the Bellamy court concluded that
§ 1322 (b) (2)'s "other than" clause referred solely to secured claims
and not to the entire bundle of rights available to home mortgage
lenders. 55 The Second Circuit also examined § 1332(b)(2)'s legislative history and pronounced that it did not support the lender's
51 Hart, 923 F.2d at 1415. The Tenth Circuit "'[began] with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language
accurately expresses the legislative purpose.'" Id. (quotations omitted).
52 Id. The Hart court argued that bifurcation is not impermissible because it does
not affect the secured portion of the claim. Id. According to one author, "[t] his analysis is flawed at its root, as § 1322(b)(2) protects the rights of residential mortgage
lenders from modification, not merely the claim." Lindauer, supra note 12, at 265
n.57. The author noted that the protection afforded by § 1322(b) (2) is to the mortgagee's rights, not claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2) (1988); In re Etchin, 128 B.R.
662, 666 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991) (explaining that "it is the 'rights of the holders' and
not the 'claims' alone which cannot be modified").
53 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992). One commentator declared that the Bellamy court
erred by ignoring the lender's "litany of rights" and deciding that only the lender's
right to monthly payments and interest were protected under § 1322(b)(2).
Klingenberg, supra note 37, at 8.
54 Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 179. The debtors, Jimmie and Cynthia Bellamy, bifurcated
the lender's mortgage claim on their primary residence into secured and unsecured
portions. Id. at 178. The outstanding amount of the promissory note secured by a
mortgage on the Bellamy's home was $151,340.85 and a valuation of the residence
reflected a $127,500 market value, leaving an unsecured claim in the amount of
$23,840.85. Id. In their plan of reorganization, the Bellamys used § 506(d) to void
the unsecured portion of the mortgage lien and reinstated the mortgage at its original contract rate on the allowed secured claim pursuant to § 1322(b) (5). Id. As a
result, the unsecured portion of the lender's claim was treated like other generally
unsecured claims and discharged pursuant to § 1322(b) (1). Id.
55 Id. at 180. The lender argued that a claim as defined by § 101(5) (A) is any
"right to payment, whether or not such right is... secured, or unsecured." Id. (quoting 11
U.S.C. § 101 (5) (A) (Supp. IV 1993)). Therefore, because the "other than" clause of
§ 1322(b) (2) protects a claim secured by the debtor's principal residence, the lender
asserted that it follows that both the secured and unsecured portions of that claim are
protected. Id. The court rejected the lender's argument and relied on the rule of the
last antecedent, ruling that § 1322(b)(2)'s "other than" clause applied only to the
secured portion of the claim because the clause immediately preceded language in
the statute describing claims secured by a security interests in real property that is the
debtor's residence. Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182, 1184
(9th Cir. 1989) (stating that a clause modifies the portion of the sentence directly
preceding it).
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contention that Congress intended to prohibit bifurcation.5 6
Unlike the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, however, the Bellamy court addressed the bifurcation issue in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Dewsnup, which prohibited a Chapter 7 debtor
from voiding the unsecured portion of a creditor's lien secured by
the debtor's real property. 7 The Bellamy court read Dewsnup's import narrowly and decided that the Dewsnup holding applied only
to Chapter 7 cases.5" Like its counterparts in the Third, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits, the Second Circuit declared that § 1322(b) (2) did
not prohibit bifurcation of a mortgage claim secured by a debtor's
principal residence pursuant to § 506(a). 59
Despite the majority of courts' plain reading of § 1322(b) (2)
as favoring debtors' bifurcation efforts, the Fifth Circuit and several
bankruptcy courts refused to allow a debtor to reap the financial
benefits of such a windfall.' Rather, these courts postulated that a
home mortgage lender's claim secured by a lien on the debtor's
principal residence may not be divided into secured and unsecured portions. 6 The minority championed its position by underscoring some of the following arguments: (1) Congress
intended to afford home mortgage lenders greater protection as
evidenced by § 1322(b) (2)'s legislative history;62 (2) the specific
56 See id. at 181-82. In support of its contention, the Second Circuit relied on the
fact that the Bankruptcy Laws Commission's Report did not specifically define modification of a secured claim to include bifurcation. Id. at 182 (citation omitted).
57 Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 182 (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992)).
See supra notes 33-34 for a discussion of Dewsnup.
58 Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 184. The court also suggested that the Dewsnup analysis
would not command a different result due to the different uses of the term "secured
claim" in §§ 506(d) and 1322(b) (2). Id. The Bellamy court summarized that "Dewsnup's analysis of § 506(d) is thus inapposite in interpreting § 1322(b) (2)." Id. at 183.
59 Id. at 179. The Second Circuit added that a solution to the problem of falling
real estate prices, if any exists, should come from Congress. Id. at 187. Specifically,
the court stated: "Were falling real estate prices to result in a significant enough
number of residential mortgages not being paid so as to reduce the funds available
for such mortgages, the remedy, if any, would be in Congress's hands." Id.
60 See In reWoodall, 123 B.R. 95, 97-98 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1990) ("[B]ifurcation of
§ 1322(b) (2) claims would result in a windfall to debtors who would then repay only
the value of their residence, and reap the benefit of their discharged 'unsecured'
claim if property values rise."). See supra note 13 and cases cited therein for a survey
of the minority approach.
61 See In re Nobleman, 968 F.2d 483, 489 (5th Cir. 1992), affd, Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993); In re Mitchell, 125 B.R. 5, 8 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1991); In re Etchin, 128 B.R. 662, 665 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991); In re Boullion, 123
B.R. 549, 551 (Bankr. W.D. Tex 1990); In re Chavez, 117 B.R. 733, 737 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1990); In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200, 203 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In re Bradshaw, 56 B.R. 742, 744 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
62 See, e.g., Boullion, 123 B.R. at 551 (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation
of § 1322(b) (2)'s legislative history, set forth in Grubbs v. Houston FirstAm. Say. Ass'n,
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provisions of § 1322(b) (2) control the application of § 506(a), a
statute of general applicability;6" (3) the definition of "claim" in
§ 101 (5) (A), which is applicable to § 1322(b) (2), includes both secured and unsecured claims, and therefore neither may be modified;' and (4) because pre-Code practice allowed a secured claim
to pass through bankruptcy unaffected, absent clear language to
the contrary, post-Code practice should remain the same.65
For example, in In re Schum,6 the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Texas opined that
§ 1322 (b) (2)'s legislative history illustrated Congress's desire to bestow greater protection upon home mortgage lenders.6 Focusing
and stating that Congress intended to create a protected class of creditors); In re
Schum, 112 B.R. 159, 162 & n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) (quoting Chapter 12's legislative history to support the proposition that modification is not allowed in Chapter
13); In re Hemsing, 75 B.R. 689, 690 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (recognizing that
§ 1322(b) (2)'s legislative history compels the protection of home mortgage lenders).
63 See, e.g., Chavez, 117 B.R. at 734 (enunciating that § 1322(b)(2) controls the
application of § 506(a) & (d)); In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703, 705 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988)
(stating that a statute's specific provisions prevail over a statute of general applicability) (citations omitted); In re Catlin, 81 B.R. 522, 524 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (emphasizing that § 1322 supersedes the inconsistent provisions of § 506); In re Hynson, 66
B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (finding that a statute of general applicability does
not prevail over a specific provision of the same enactment) (citations omitted).
64 See In reSauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (refusing to focus on
§ 506(a)'s definition of secured and unsecured claims); see also Etchin, 128 B.R. at 668
(using the broad definition of the word "claim," as stated in § 101 (5) (A), to reach its
conclusion that bifurcation is prohibited). Section 101 (5) (A) states that a claim is " [a]
right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced tojudgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (A) (1988).
65 See In re Hart, 923 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir. 1991) (summarizing the four rationales employed by bankruptcy courts in the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits) (citations and footnote omitted); see, e.g., Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. at 203 (maintaining the
continuity of treatment of secured claims under § 1322(b) (2) from Chapter XIII of
the Bankruptcy Act to Chapter 13 of the Code); Mitchelg 125 B.R. at 8 (explaining that
"the prior Bankruptcy Act did not allow Chapter 13 debtors to modify secured
claims").
66 112 B.R. 159 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990). David Allen Schum borrowed approximately $207,960 from MBank Preston, Dallas, Texas. Id. at 160. The loan was secured
by a deed of trust on his primary residence. Id. The initial thirty year note was subsequently renewed on October 11, 1987, and upon default the bank demanded payment for the outstanding balance of the note. Id. The debtor filed for bankruptcy
and sought to reduce the amount of the outstanding indebtedness-$207,960-to
the fair market value of the residence pursuant to § 506(a). Id. The bank argued that
§ 1322(b) (2) prohibited the bifurcation of its claim. Id.
67 Id. at 161-62 & n.3. The Schum court reported that the Congressional discussion
of Chapter 12 specifically supported the proposition that home mortgage lenders
were granted greater protection. Id. at 162 n.4. In Chapter 12's legislative history, the
court explicated, Congress specifically indicated that while the contents of a Chapter
12 plan of reorganization came from both Chapter 11 and Chapter 13, § 1322(b) (2)
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on the meaning of the word "modify" in § 1322(b) (2), the bankruptcy court insisted that a debtor would certainly be modifying a
home mortgage lender's claim if bifurcation was permitted.6"
Moreover, the Schum court explained that § 1322(b) (2)'s specific
provisions trumped the general provisions of § 506(a).69 The
court stated that these arguments singularly, and taken as a whole,
supported the court's holding that § 1322(b) (2) prohibits modification of a home mortgage lender's claim on a debtor's principal
residence. 7'
In keeping with the minority view, the Bankruptcy Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin, in In re Etchin,71 similarly articulated that "lien stripping" was impermissible. 72 The Etchin court
maintained that the word "claim" in § 1322(b) (2), as defined in
§ 101 (5) (A), included both secured and unsecured claims. 73 Having found that § 1322(b) (2) protected more than secured claims,
was omitted from Chapter 12 to allow farmers to modify secured home mortgage
claims. Id. (quotation omitted).
68 Id. at 161-62. See supra note 15 (providing the Schum court's definition of
.modify").
69 Id. at 160-61 (citing In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703, 705 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988) (citations omitted); In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 249-50 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (citations
omitted)).
70 Id. at 162. As a result, the court concluded that "lien stripping" was prohibited
by the clear language of section 1322(b) (2). Id.; see Lindauer, supra note 12, at 261
n.26 ("'Strip down' means that the creditor must stand and be stripped bare of its
unsecured lien.... [This term] has come to be used in any situation where § 506
operates on an undersecured creditor.").
71 128 B.R. 662 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991). Star Acquisition Corporation (Star) foreclosed on a real estate mortgage given by Joseph and Juanita Etchin as security for a
debt. Id. at 664. By filing separate bankruptcy petitions, the Etchins stayed the foreclosure sale. Id. Their individual cases were subsequently consolidated for administrative purposes on November 20, 1990. Id. The debtors then brought an adversary
proceeding for ajudicial determination of Star's secured claim and avoidance of the
unsecured portion of the mortgagee's claim Id. Star sought dismissal of the adversary
proceeding pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) and Bankruptcy
Rule 7012, claiming that § 1322(b) (2) prohibits the "strip down" of their claim secured by the debtor's principal residence. Id. at 665.
72 Id. at 664.
73 Id. at 668. The bankruptcy court further criticized the Hougland court's reasoning, stating:
The mistake in... Hougland ...

is that it limits the pool of other possi-

ble referents of the anti-modification clause to either "the unsecured
language or to the whole sentence" and then dismisses them. The court
neglects to consider as referents the larger universe of claims which are
defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101 (5) (A) provides that a "claim"
includes both secured and unsecured claims. This definition of "claim"
is applicable to § 1322(b) (2).
Id. (citations omitted). See supra notes 64 (providing the text of § 101(5) (A)) and 26
(setting forth the relevant parts of § 1322).
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the bankruptcy court held that a debtor could not strip down a lien
on a primary residence."4 Strip down, the Etchin court explained,
required modification of a homestead mortgage lender's "claim," a
practice that would directly violate § 1322(b) (2)."
Adopting the minority rationale, in In re Kaczmarczyk,76 the
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nebraska agreed that
§ 1322(b) (2) prohibited bifurcation. 7" Analyzing the bifurcation
issue from Chapter 13's historical perspective, the Kaczmarczyk
court pointed to pre-Code practice wherein a debtor could not
modify secured claims. 7s Absent a specific provision in Chapter 13
dictating otherwise, the bankruptcy court commented, this rule
79
must be honored today.
Seizing the occasion to resolve the split among the circuits, the
United States Supreme Court definitively addressed the bifurcation
issue in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank."° The Nobelman Court
questioned whether a homestead lender's rights are impermissibly
modified when a debtor divides the amount of a claim secured by a
home mortgage on his principal residence into secured and unsecured portions.8 "
Delivering the opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice
Thomas first rejected the debtors' contention that even though
§ 1322(b) (2) prohibited the modification of a home mortgage
lender's rights, their plan of reorganization did not modify the
mortgagee's rights.8 " Specifically, Justice Thomas dismissed the
Etchin, 128 B.R. at 669.
Id. See supra note 70 for an explanation of the term "strip down." For a brief
analysis of the Etchin court's reasoning, see MaCauley, supra note 16, at 1276.
76 107 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989). Michael and Myrna Kaczmarczyk's residence was valued at $30,000 and was security for two mortgages, the first in the
amount of $28,000 and the second in the amount of $11,000. Id. at 200, 201. In their
plan of reorganization, the debtors left the first mortgage intact as it was fully secured
and treated the second mortgage as secured in the amount of $2,000 and unsecured
in the amount of $9,000. Id. The second mortgagee objected to the treatment of its
claim and urged that the court reject the debtors' plan because it violated
§ 1322(b) (2)'s restriction on modification of a home mortgage lender's rights. Id.
77 Id. at 202.
78 Id. at 202-03 (citations omitted). Chapter 13 under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
precluded a debtor "from dealing with claims secured by real property." See Lindauer, supra note 12, at 267 (footnote omitted).
79 Id. at 203. The court stated that "as Congress did not explicitly change the
treatment of claims secured by a mortgage on a debtor's residence, I conclude that a
continuity of treatment of such claims was intended." Id.
80 113 S. Ct. 2106, 2108, 2109 (1993).
81 Id. at 2108.
82 Id. at 2108, 2109-11. Justice Thomas wrote that it "appears to be impossible" to
reduce the principal amount of the loan to the fair market value of the residence
without modifying the lender's rights. Id. at 2111.
74
75
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Nobelmans' explanation that the language of § 1322(b) (2) excepts
from modification only the secured portion of the mortgage
claim."3 Although the Nobelman Court recognized that other circuits had applied the "rule of the last antecedent" when interpreting § 1322(b) (2), Justice Thomas adopted a broader definition of
"claim" which encompassed both secured and unsecured claims.8 4
To embrace the debtor's interpretation of § 1322(b)(2), the Justice asserted, would in essence render the statute's protection
meaningless.8 5
The Court further strengthened its holding by stressing that
§ 1322(b)(2) protects a homestead lender's "rights," not "claims"
or "claims secured only by" the debtor's primary residence.8 6 Justice Thomas conceded, however, that the amount of a secured
claim is properly defined under § 506(a) and that the debtors were
correct in seeking such a valuation.8 7 Nonetheless, the Justice intimated that such a determination of the secured portion of the
claim did not limit or define the mortgagee's rights.88
Particularly, Justice Thomas observed that because Texas law
governed American's rights, 8 9 § 1322(b) (2) protected the bank's
83 Id. at 2109. The debtors argued that because the language of§ 1322(b) (2) provides that a plan may "'modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a
claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtors'principalresidence,'"
then it follows that the 'other than' clause refers only to the clause immediately preceding it; thus it only applies to the secured portion of the claim. Id. (quotation
omitted). The debtors further stated that pursuant to § 506(a), a claim is only secured up to the value of the collateral and unsecured for the remainder. Id. Consequently, the debtors asserted that in agreeing to pay the full amount of the secured
claim at the original contract rate, their plan of reorganization was not modifying the
secured lender's rights. Id.
84 Id. at 2111 (citing In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted); In re Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1989)). The court acknowledged that although such an interpretation was grammatically correct, it was not compelled. Id. See supra note 55 (discussing the "rule of the last antecedent").
85 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111.
86 Id. at 2109-10. Furthermore, the Court rejected the debtors' narrow reading of
the "other than" exception and determined that Congress's use of the words "claim
secured ... by" instead of the term "secured claim" reflected the view that the broader
definition of claim was applicable to § 1322(b)(2). Id. at 2110.
87 Id. See supra note 23 for the text of § 506(a).
88 Nobleman, 113 S. CL at 2110. Justice Thomas articulated that the term "rights" is
not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Id. Therefore, the Court had to look to state
law to determine the mortgagee's property rights because "[p1roperty interests are
created and defined by state law." Id. (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48,
55 (1979)).
89 Id. at 2110. The mortgagee's rights recognizable under Texas law, the Court
explained, include: the right to repayment of the principal plus interest, the right to
keep a lien securing the collateral until the loan is paid in full, the right to accelerate
the loan or to foreclose on the mortgage collateral upon default, and the right to a
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state law property rights.9" The Court pointed out that the lender's
contractual rights included both the secured and unsecured portions of the claim.9 1 Accordingly, the Court surmised, the debtors
could not change the terms of the unsecured portion of the claim
without simultaneously modifying the secured portion.9 2 Thus, the
Court held that such a modification is prohibited under
the modification alters a home mortgage
§ 1322(b) (2) because
93
lender's rights.
In a one paragraph concurring opinion, Justice Stevens remarked that it appeared "somewhat strange" that a bankrupt
debtor is not afforded greater protection in safeguarding his primary residence. 9 4 The Justice observed, however, that such an
anomalous result is commanded by § 1322(b) (2)'s legislative history.9 5 Noting with approval Justice Thomas's literal interpretation
deficiency judgment should the proceeds of a foreclosure sale be insufficient to satisfy
the amount of the judgment. Id. (citation omitted).
90 Id. The Court remarked that the state law rights may nonetheless be subject to
modification by other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. In particular, the
Nobelman Court explicated, § 362(a)'s automatic stay provision limits the enforcement
of a lender's right to foreclose, and § 1322(b) (5)'s cure provision allows a debtor to
cure a mortgage default notwithstanding § 1322(b)(2)'s anti-modification provision.
Id. (citations omitted).
91 Id. at 2111. Both the secured and unsecured claims, the Court stated, were
contained in a single promissory note in the amount of $68,250 and secured by the
deed of trust. Id. at 2108, 2111. See supra note 20 and accompanying text for a definition of a deed of trust and a discussion of the Nobelmans' loan from American.
92 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111. The Court explained:
The bank's contractual rights are contained in a unitary note that applies at once to the bank's overall claim, including both the secured and
unsecured components. Petitioners cannot modify the payment and interest terms for the unsecured component, as they propose to do, without also modifying the terms of the secured component. Thus, to
preserve the interest rate and the amount of each monthly payment
specified in the note after having reduced the principal to $23,500, the
plan would also have to reduce the term of the note dramatically. That
would be a significant modification of a contractual right.
Id. The Court further commented that the lenders had an adjustable rate mortgage
requiring a recalculation of the principal and interest owed on the note each time the
interest rate changed. Id. Because the loan documents did not indicate whether the
amortization should be based on the outstanding principal or on the "unamortized
value of the collateral," the Nobelman Court decided that to reduce the amount of the
loan to the fair market value of the collateral, pursuant to § 506(a), would require a
modification of the lender's rights under the note. Id. This modification, the Court
explained, would occur because such a reduction would in effect require an amortization on less than the full amount of the note. Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 2111-12 (StevensJ, concurring).
95 Id. at 2112 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Specifically, the Justice
stated that Congress "intended to encourage the flow of capital into the home lending market." Id. (citation omitted).
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of § 1322(b) (2), Justice Stevens stated that such an approach was
allegiant to Congress's intent.96
From the early days of debtor imprisonment, 97 American
bankruptcy law has continually evolved from a system favoring
creditors who were first to reach a debtor's assets to a more orderly
scheme providing for a ratable distribution of assets and granting
the debtor a fresh start.9" Debtor fresh start, however, is only one
of bankruptcy's policy objectives; another is the promotion of an
"open-credit economy. " " In Nobelman, the majority and concurring opinions correctly recognized that the Bankruptcy Code's
fresh start policy cannot supersede a statute's plain meaning, nor
can it override Congress's specific goal of ensuring a "flow of capital into the home lending market" by providing home mortgage
lenders with special protection. 0 0
The Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits each generally
purported to ground their pro-bifurcation decisions on a plain
reading of § 1322(b) (2).101 Their statutory construction approach,
however, failed to account for the specific limitations placed on a
debtor's right to modify a mortgage claim secured by the debtor's
primary residence. 10 2 Furthermore, it is doubtful that the courts'
decisions can be based on a plain reading of § 1322(b) (2). The
statute is clear and no amount of legal sophistry can change its
plain meaning-there can be no modification of the rights of a
103
holder of a claim secured by the debtor's principal residence.
96 Id.
97 According to one author:

Debtor imprisonment continued to be a prevalent practice in the
United States until after 1830 .... While debtor imprisonment lasted...
there were periods of time during which substantially more debtors occupied prisons than convicted criminals. In Pennsylvania, New York,
Massachusetts and Maryland, there were three to five times as many persons imprisoned for debt as for crime.
Susan Jensen-Conklin, NondischargeableDebts In Chapter 13: "Fresh Start" Or "HavenFor
Criminals"?, 7 BANKR. DEv. J. 517, 520-21 (1990) (quotation omitted).
98 See COLLIER, supra note 2, 1 1300.01, at 1300-9 n.II (citing Wilson v. City Bank,
84 U.S. 473, 480-81 (1873)). The Wilson court explained that the primary objective of
the bankruptcy process "is to secure a just distribution of the bankrupt's property
among his creditors" and the secondary objective "is the release of the bankrupt from
the obligation to pay the debts of those creditors." Wilson, 84 U.S. at 480-81.
99 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 68.
100 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2112 (Stevens, J., concurring).
101 See In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Hart, 923 F.2d 1410,
1415 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 127
(3d Cir. 1990); In re Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1989). See supra notes
40-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bellamy, Hart, Wilson, and Hougland
102 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
103 See id.
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"Claim," as defined by § 101 (A) (5), includes both unsecured
as well as secured claims. 10 4 Moreover, a lender's contractual
rights, as defined by state law, include both the secured and unsecured portions of a claim.' 0 5 Any lingering doubt as to the statute's meaning is dissipated when one examines its legislative
history.'0 6 Specifically, the Senate's version of the bill and the series of compromises that took place in adopting § 1322(b)(2)
demonstrate conclusively that Congress intended
to afford greater
10 7
protection to home mortgage lenders.
The Nobelman Court refrained from tailoring a statute's meaning simply to reach a pragmatic result, namely giving a debtor a
fresh start.'0 8 The Court's interpretation is not only the more reasonable approach, but also ensures adherence to Congressional intent. Furthermore, the Court's approach promotes stability in the
home mortgage market by guaranteeing that both lenders and borrowers receive the benefit of their bargain." ° The United States
Supreme Court's reasoned approach in Nobelman is both fair and
practical because it assures that affordable mortgage rates and adequate funds will continue to be available to home buyers.
Paulj Bento
104 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1993). See supra note 64 for the text of
§ 101 (5)(A).
105 See supra note 89 (listing the mortgagee's rights recognizable under Texas law).
106 See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 429, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6384; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 204; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
141, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5927.
107 See Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 242-346 (5th Cir.
1984) (chronicling the legislative history of Chapter 13 of the Code).
108 One commentator suggested that bifurcation and strip down would not further
the Code's fresh start policy because there is no change in the debtor's present financial condition at the time of the strip down as mortgage payments remain the same on
the secured portion of the claim. Lindauer, supranote 12, at 281. The only effect of
the strip down is to eliminate future payments, that would become due long after the
debtor's plan has run its course. Id. Such a result "looks more like a favorable deal
on the price of a home and less like a 'fresh start.'" Id.
109 See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992) (stating that a creditor's
lien stays with the real property until foreclosure and cannot be stripped down because those are the rights "bargained for by the mortgagor and the mortgagee").
Perhaps an even more compelling argument against mortgage bifurcation and strip
down is that the debtor receives a windfall if the value of the property rises. For example, suppose a debtor has a mortgage in the amount of $200,000 on his primary residence but the market value is only $150,000. The plan of reorganization could
bifurcate the claim and strip down the amount of the lien to $150,000. Later, should
the property appreciate in value to its original mortgage amount of $200,000, the
debtor would obtain a windfall of $50,000. Such a result is unfair to the lender who
loses the benefit of his bargain.

